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1. Russell's paradox and absolute generality
Russell's paradox, as standardly interpreted, shows that there cannot be a universal set,
that is, a set containing all sets as its elements. This result raises several philosophically
interesting questions. For example, given that there is no universal set, it becomes
necessary to have some other conception of the collection of all sets and, related to it, an
explanation for why is it that there cannot be a set of all sets. The standard set-theoretical
reply is to argue that the collection of all sets could not be a set because somehow it is
too big to be one. Collections of such kind are usually called proper classes.
It can be further argued that Russell's paradox also shows that when we try to
generalize over everything, we are not generalizing over the members of a set. If someone
puts forward a setU that allegedly corresponds to the collection of absolutely everything,
by a reasoning similar to the one employed in the paradox, it will be possible to prove
the existence of an object not belonging to U (namely, the set of all non-self-membered
sets in U ). But what then are we quantifying over?
Independently of what kind of objects belong to the domain of quantication,
philosophically speaking, claiming that we are quantifying over the members of a proper
class does not seem very satisfactory. Firstly, because it is not clear in what sense might a
collection be too big to be a set. Secondly, because the only reason to accept the existence
of proper classes is the threat of paradox. Thus, even if appealing to the existence of
proper classes somehow avoids the paradox, it clearly fails to explain it.
In the set-theoretical case, a possible move on the face of this difculty is to argue that
Russell's paradox actually shows that there cannot be a completed collection containing
all sets: if someone puts forward a collection that purports to be the collection of all sets,
it will be possible to prove the existence of a set not belonging to it. Following Michael
Dummett (1991), one can then claim that the set-theoretical universe is indenitely
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extensible. One can also consider applying this strategy for the absolutely general case.
Since an absolutely general domain would need to range over everything, in particular, it
would need to range over every set. Thus, it could be claimed that we fail when trying to
quantify over absolutely everything because the domain of quantication can always be
extended. Let us call the proponent of this claim the generality relativist.
David Lewis (1991), Vann McGee (2000) and Timothy Williamson (2003) have put
forward similar versions of an argument for the claim that generality relativism is a
self-defeating thesis. The problem, as presented by the latter, can be put in the following
way. In order to assume that it is not possible to quantify over absolutely everything, one
must be committed with the claim that there must be something that is not in the range
of the (allegedly) absolutely general quantier. But then the generality relativist is not
only committed with the objects within the range of the quantier, but also with those
lying beyond its reach. In other words, in order to state his thesis, the generality relativist
appears to be himself quantifying over absolutely everything.
2. Fine's version of the extensibility argument
Our goal in the rest of this paper is to discuss a reformulation of the generality relativist
thesis that has been proposed by Kit Fine (2006). For that purpose, we will adopt Fine's
terminology, calling universalist to the person arguing in favor of the intelligibility of
quantiers ranging over absolutely all sets and limitativist to the person arguing against it.
Adopting Fine's notation, use I , J ,... as variables for interpretations of the quantiers,
and I0, J0,... as constants for particular interpretations. Moreover, use ∃Ixϕ (x), with I
as a subscript of the quantiers, to indicate that there is some x under interpretation I for
which ϕ (x).1 We begin by reviewing the indenite extensibility argument according to
this notation.
The universalist claims to have an absolutely general understanding of quantica-
tion, so let us assume that his intended use of the quantiers conforms to a particular
interpretation I0 of quantication. He may then express his claim as,
1. ∀x∃I0y (y = x) ∧ ∀I0y∃x (x = y).
Now, from
2. ∃J0y∀I0x (x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x)
by a Russell style reasoning, we may derive
3. ∃J0y∀I0x (x 6= y).
1 Fine acknowledges that it would be more appropriate to use of a meta-linguistic form of expression like
the sentence ∃xϕ (x) is true under interpretation I rather than ∃Ixϕ (x). However, as there will be nothing
in the following that conicts with that convention, in the interest of presentation he adopts the more
straightforward notation. We will follow his example on this.
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Dening I ⊆ J as ∀Ix∃Jy (x = y), [3] can be rewritten as
3'. ¬ (J0 ⊆ I0).
Let UR (I) be I is absolutely unrestricted. The universalist claims that
4. UR (I0)→ J0 ⊆ I0.
Finally, from [3'] and [4] it follows
5. ¬UR (I0).
The argument from [1] to [5] has shown that the interpretation I0 is not absolutely
unrestricted. But to make its case fully convincing, the limitativist still needs to make a
claim about all interpretations. That is, what the limitativist has done up to this point was
to show that given an interpretation like I0 (that is, an interpretation put forward as being
absolutely general) it is possible to extend it. However, he wants to make a stronger claim,
namely, one concerning the possibility of extending every interpretation. Some further
argument thus seems to be needed. Given that the previous argument did not contain
any special assumptions about I0, it might seem that a generalization of that argument
would do the trick. So, let the rst premise of the new argument be a generalized version
of [2].
2G. ∀I∃J∃Jy∀Ix (x ∈ y ↔ x /∈ x).
[2G] seems plausible since it simply says that according to some interpretation of quan-
tication there is the set of all the non-self-membered sets that exist according to some
other interpretation of quantication. Then, by reasoning in a similar way to Russell's
Paradox, it is possible to show that the range of quantication corresponding to the latter
interpretation cannot be contained in the range associated with the former. That is,
3G. ∀I∃J (¬ (J ⊆ I)).
Dene an interpretation I to be maximal, max (I), if ∀J (J ⊆ I). It then becomes
possible to express [3G] as
3G'. ∀I¬max (I).
Generalizing the claim made in [4] we obtain
4G. ∀I (UR (I)→ max (I)).
And nally, from [3G'] and [4G]
5G. ∀I¬UR (I).
This concludes our reformulation of the extensibility argument in Fine's notation.
At rst sight [5G] might appear to be the conclusion that the limitativist was after, for
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it says that there is no interpretation of quantication which is absolutely unrestricted.
However, a more careful look will reveal that just as the universalist use of the quantier
over objects was shown not to be absolutely unrestricted, it may also be shown that the
quantier over interpretations is not absolutely unrestricted. In the rest of this section
we present Fine's argument to show how could someone try to argue that generality
relativism is self-defeating within the framework provided by his notation.
Remember that the limitativist wanted to make a claim concerning the possibil-
ity of extending every interpretation. Thus, the quantier in [5G] needs to range over
every interpretation. Thus, assume that there is an interpretationM0 to which the current
interpretation of the quantier over interpretations conforms:
6. ∀I∃M0J (J = I) ∧ ∀M0J∃I (I = J).
Among the several rst-order interpretations (of quantication over objects) that
may be associated with a second-order interpretationM (of quantication over inter-
pretations), there is an interpretation I that is maximal.2 Call the later the sum interpretation
of M . It will then be the case that if ∃MJ∃Jxϕ (x) then ∃Ixϕ (x).3 Now if M0 is
2 The following remark lends support to this last claim. If you claim to have a quantier that allegedly
quanties over absolutely everything, you also have a rst-order interpretation of quantication In
associated with it. As we have seen, by a Russell style reasoning, we are able to extend the range of
that quantier and obtain a new range, encompassing one more object than the previous. Notice that
by doing this, we also obtain a new rst-order interpretation In+1. This new range may momentarily
be understood as being absolutely general, however by a Russell style reasoning it will also be possible
to extend it. This procedure can be iterated indenitely and can never be seen as completed. We
could now describe a quantier that ranges over the rst-order interpretations, our understanding
of it corresponding to a second-order interpretation. It seems that its range can also be extended
indenitely. Actually, these extensions are achieved by the exact same procedure that extends the range
of a rst-order interpretation: expanding a range of quantication presented as being absolutely general
amounts to arriving at a new understanding of quantication, that is, at a new rst-order interpretation
In+1; in turn, this new interpretation expands the range of quantication over interpretations and
allows us to arrive at a new second-order interpretation Mn+1. Therefore, to the initial rst-order
interpretation I0 corresponds a second-order interpretation M0, to I1 corresponds a new second-
order interpretation M1 (notice that the range of quantication corresponding to the second-order
interpretation M1 contains two rst-order interpretations I0 and I1 while the range corresponding
to M0 only contains I0) and so on and so forth. Now, Fine claims that among the several rst-
order interpretations that may be associated with a second-order interpretation, there is a rst-order
interpretation that is maximal. The justication for this claim seems to be the following. Suppose that
we stop the extension process of the range of absolutely general quantication at a certain point. When
this process stops, so does the process of extending the range of quantication over interpretations. So,
given a second-order interpretationMn, there will be a rst-order interpretation In that corresponds
to the range that the (allegedly) absolutely general quantier has when the extension process stopped.
It is then clear that In will be the maximal rst-order interpretation associated withMn. For instance,
the maximal interpretation associated withM0 is I0, the maximal interpretation associatedM1 is I1
and so forth and so on.
3 Take∃M0J∃Jxϕ (x). Then∃J0xϕ (x). Let I0 be the sum interpretation ofM0. By denition,J0 ⊆ I0,
therefore ∃I0xϕ (x).
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absolutely unrestricted, its sum interpretation will be maximal with respected to every
other interpretation. That is
7. UR (M0)→ ∃M0I∀M (J ⊆ I)
and by denition
8. UR (M0)→ ∃I (max (I)).
But given [3G']
9. ¬UR (M0).
The previous argument thus raises a particularly troubling difculty for the limita-
tivist. For it appears to have shown that it follows from the truth of its own claim that
the interpretation of the quantier in it cannot be absolutely unrestricted. Remember
that for [5G] to have its intended import, the quantier in it needs to range over every
rst-order interpretation. In [6] we assumed thatM0 corresponded to the second-order
interpretation of that quantier but [9] says that M0 is not absolutely unrestricted. It
follows from the truth of [9] that there are rst-order interpretations lying outside the
range of the quantier in [5G] and so the latter appears to be self-defeating.
3. Fine's modal version of generality relativism
Fine begins his attempt to deal with the issue of absolute generality by proposing a
modal formulation of the limitativist position. Use I ⊂ J for J (properly) extends I and
say that I is extensible  in symbols, E (I)  if possibly some interpretation extends
it, i.e. ♦∃J (I ⊂ J). Limitativism is then characterized in terms of the two following
claims:
(L) ∀IE (I)
and
(L)+∀IE (I) (i.e. ∀I♦∃J (I ⊂ J)).
The modal limitativist says that the concept delimiting the quantier is extensible if (L)
holds and that it is indenitely extensible if (L)+ holds.
Call the notions of possibility and necessity relevant to the formulation of (L) and
(L)+ postulational modalities. Here is the basic idea behind such notions:
For suppose someone proposes an interpretation of the quantier and I then attempt to do a
`Russell' on him. Everyone can agree that if I succeed in coming up with a broader interpretation,
then it shows the original interpretation not to have been absolutely unrestricted. Suppose now
that no one in fact does a Russell on him. Does that mean that his interpretation was unrestricted
after all? Clearly not. All that matters is that the interpretation should be possible. But the relevant
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notion of possibility is then the one we were after; it bears directly on the issue of unrestricted
quantication, without regard for the empirical vicissitudes of actual interpretation. (Fine (2006),
p. 35)
4. Interlude
Before going into the details of the modal formulation, we think that it is worth making
a couple of remarks concerning the dialectics of the discussion so far. Remember that
Williamson's argument tries to establish that the limitativist position concerning absolute
generality is self-defeating. However, since Fine's discussion is particularly concernedwith
sets (remember his denitions of universalist and limitativist presented at the beginning of
section 2), it seems that he might not be addressing the challenge that Williamson puts
forward. On the other hand, it also seems that although the limitativist has difculties
in the absolutely general case, his case still holds within the set theoretical framework. I
will now try to show that both of these claims correspond to misinterpretations of the
discussion.
Concerning the latter, just consider a variation of Williamson's argument whose rst
premise would be: It is impossible to quantify over absolutely every set. One can
plausibly assume that this sentence expresses a claim that the limitativist would endorse.
Then, by following a similar line of argument, it can easily be seen that we will end up with
the following contradictory claim: Some set over which the limitativist is quantifying at
t0 is not being quantied over by the limitativist at t0. Thus, by means of a variant of
Williamson's argument, the legitimacy of the limitativist position within the set-theoretical
framework can also be called into question.
In order to see how Fine actually addresses Williamson's challenge, remember the
limitativist strategy to deny the coherence of the notion of absolutely general domain: once
the universalist puts forward a particular domain purporting to be absolutely general, the
limitativist goes on to show that there is a set not belonging to that domain. Williamson
then claims that in order to put forward his thesis, the limitativist not only needs to be
quantifying over this set but also over all the other sets which are eventually put forward as
counter-examples to the universalist claim. The problem raised by this is that quantifying
over all these other sets while also quantifying over what the universalist puts forward as
being an absolutely general domain of quantication seems to equate with quantifying
over absolutely everything (even according to the limitativist's own standards). But then,
even if Fine restricts his discussion of the debate between universalism and limitativism
to a set-theoretical framework, he ends up addressing Williamson's challenge. That is, if
it is possible to show that those other sets are not being quantied over by the limitativist
when he puts forward his thesis, the universalist would no longer be able to accuse him
of holding a self-defeating thesis.
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5. Restrictionism and expansionism
We now go back to Fine's proposed version of generality-relativism. According to his
terminology, a postulational possibility consists in the possibility of reinterpreting the domain
of quantication and a proposition (like the one expressed by There are more sets.) is
said to be postulationally possible if its truth value depends on the possibility of reinterpreting
the domain of quantication. It thus seems that a better understanding of the notion of
postulational modality can be achieved by trying to grasp how Fine understands the process
by means of which the reinterpretation of a quantier occurs.
One model that he considers, consists in understanding the interpretation of a
quantier as being given by a predicate that restricts the range of the quantier. Call this
view restrictionism. According to Fine, a crucial difculty for restrictionism arises when
it tries to give an account of the move that he calls the Russell jump. To see this, begin
by assuming an initial understanding of quantication represented by ∀I0 and ∃I0 . Now
form the set RI0 of all the non-self-membered sets in the range of ∀I0 . According to
limitativism, by a Russell style reasoning we conclude thatRI0 could not be in the range of
∀I0 which allows us to (Russell) jump and arrive at a new understanding of quantication
(represented by ∀I1 and ∃I1 ) and according to which ∃I1x∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y). The
condition ∀y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) seems to play a crucial role in the jump in the sense that
it is apparently by means of it that the new understanding is given. But how exactly?
According to Fine, the only answer the restrictionist is able to provide is that that
condition is used to relax the restriction on the quantier that is already in play. Thus
suppose that ∀I0 is restricted to objects satisfying the predicate θ (x). Hence, ∀I0xϕ (x)
is tantamount to saying ∀I0x [θ (x) : ϕ (x)] (to be read: every θ-set is a ϕ-set). The
effect of considering the condition ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) is a weakening of the initial
restriction to θ (x)∨∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y). According to this understanding ∀I1xϕ (x)
is tantamount to saying ∀x [θ (x) ∨ ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) : ϕ (x)] (to be read: every
θ-set or set that contains all the non-self-membered sets in the range of ∀I0 , is a ϕ
set). Notice however that this proposal does not deliver the right results. We wanted the
quantier ∀I0 to include one new set in its domain, namely, the set of all (and only) the
non-self-membered sets in the range of ∀I0 . But the restriction ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y)
not only picks out that set but also all those other sets that have all of the non-self-
membered sets in the range of ∀I0 as members. For example, by iteration of the Russell
jump we can go on to obtain an understanding of quantication  represented by ∀I2
and ∃I2  and such that in the range of ∀I2 there is a set RI1 of all the non-self-
membered sets in the range of ∀I1 . The setRI1 also contains all the non-self-membered
sets in the range of ∀I0 (and moreover it contains RI0 ) however the rst Russell jump
clearly does lead us to an understanding of quantication according to which RI1 falls
in the range of ∀I1 .
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We now move on to Fine's account of the Russell's jump. Instead of understanding
the condition ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) as dening a new predicate by which the quantier
is to be restricted, he proposes that we should understand it as indicating how the range
of the quantier is to be extended. Fine claims that there is an instruction or procedural
postulate associated with the condition ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y), requiring us to introduce
a set RI0 whose members are all the non-self-membered sets in the range of ∀I0 . By
introducing RI0 one immediately arrives at a new understanding of the quantier 
again, represented by ∀I1 and ∃I1  and can reinterpret it as ranging over the domain
resulting from adding x to the sets in the range of ∀I0 .
According to Fine, this expansionist way of understanding the reinterpretation of a
quantier has several advantages over restrictionism. One of them is that through the
expansionist approach, one is sure to obtain the desired extension of the domain. This
is guaranteed by the nature of the postulational method: it is not possible to postulate
into existence a set that stands in the membership relation to sets that do not belong
to the range of the quantier. For example, the Russell jump by which we arrive at
the understanding of quantication represent by ∀I1 does not let in too many sets,
since the condition ∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) only allows for the postulation of one set,
namely, the set RI0 containing all and only the non-self-membered sets in the range
of ∀I0 . The postulation of the set RI1 , for instance, is not allowed by the condition
∀I0y (y ∈ x↔ y /∈ y) because RI1 stands in the membership relation with RI0 (in the
sense that RI0 ∈ RI1 ) and RI0 is not in the range of ∀I0 .
Fine claims that under the restrictionist account, the old and new domains are to be
understood as restrictions, but these are not to be understood as restricting some broader
domain.4 Under the expansionist account, on the other hand, the new domain is not to
be understood as a new restriction but rather as an expansion. What we are provided
with is a way of seeing how it might be expanded. The crucial difference between these
approaches seems to be the following. As pointed out, on the restrictionist account there
is the risk that the reinterpretation of the quantier over sets bymeans of a new restricting
predicate lets in toomany sets. However, even supposing that this does not happen, belief
that the domain has actually been extended and that there is a new set, is not automatically
justied. For according to the restrictionist account, the Russell jump consists in relaxing
the restriction imposed on the quantication over sets and subsequently adopting a
new restriction according to which there might be a new set. However, the existence of
this new set and actual expansion of the range of quantication are not guaranteed by
reinterpretation of the quantier. By contrast, under the expansionist account, the new
understanding of quantication is arrived at by the discovery of a set that is not in the
4 Actually, it seems hard to make sense of such a possibility. If the interpretations are not restricting some
wider domain, then what are they restricting? That is, if they are not restricting some wider domain,
in what sense are they restricting?
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range of quantication over sets and that, as a set, should belong to it. Thus, success
in the act of reinterpretation cannot be understood independently of the belief in the
existence of a set that provokes the extension of the domain.
6. Relatively unrestricted quantication
Fine (2006, p. 40) endows the universalist with the view that there is absolutely unrestricted
quantication and claims that this view should be understood as the conjunction of two
distinct positions:
But if I am right, the view is really a conjunction of two distinct positions, one signied by `unre-
stricted' and the other by `absolutely'. The rst is the afrmation of unrestricted (i.e. completely
unrestricted) quantication. The second is the rejection of any relativity in the interpretation of
the quantier beyond a restriction on its range; once the range of the quantier has been specied
by means of a suitable predicate, or even by the absence of a predicate, then there is nothing else
upon which its interpretation might depend.
I must confess that I am not completely sure of having understood this characteri-
zation. My difculty lies in the fact that according to it universalism allows for a form of
absolutely unrestricted quantication that is restricted by a concept.
Remember that according to limitativism, quantication over sets is always relative
to a particular interpretation and that by the Russell jump we are able to arrive at other
interpretations. Let us again suppose that we are quantifying over sets. The universalist
will claim that it is possible to quantify over absolutely every set, thus denying that
quantication always needs to be relative to some interpretation. This corresponds to
the absolutely part of the above characterization and to me it appears to be clear. What I
nd confusing is that according to the above characterization, even though the range of
the quantier is restricted to sets, this quantication might still be called absolutely unre-
stricted. Why not call it absolutely restricted?5 The universalist would then reserve absolutely
unrestricted to the case where no predicate delimits the range of the quantier, like when
he (allegedly) quanties over absolutely everything.
I think that this same distinction might be useful for characterizing the position
held by Fine. According to his version of limitativism, quantication always has to be
understood as being relative to an interpretation and this is why he defends that the most
general form of quantication wemight come up with is a relatively unrestricted quantication:
even if the range of the quantier is not restricted by any concept, it is always relative to
some interpretation of quantication. On the other hand, in the case of quantication
over sets we have a relatively restricted quantication: the range is restricted in such a way
5 It might sound odd to call quantication over absolutely all sets absolutely restricted but I guess that it is less
confusing than calling it absolutely unrestricted while being restricted to sets. There might be a worry that
by adopting this distinction, Fine's expansionist limitativism collapses into a form of restrictionism. I
will try to explain why this is not so in the following footnote.
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that nothing other than sets belongs to it; moreover, the range is always relative to some
interpretation of the quantier.6
7. Expansionism and (L)
Finally, I want to go back to expansionism and the question of how it might allow us to
provide a reply to what I have called Williamson's challenge. Remember that to win this
challenge, the generality relativist needs to put forward a non-self-defeating version of
his thesis. I take it that so far this challenge has not been won in any decisive way and that
expansionism is to be seen as an attempt at it. At least, that is what seems to be implied
by Fine (2006, p. 41) in the following passage:
The restrictionists have operated within an unduly limited model of how domain extension might
be achieved; and I believe that it is only by embracing expansionism that a more adequate account
of domain extension and a more viable form of opposition to universalism can be sustained.
Remember that Fine proposed characterization of limitativism was given in terms of
the two following formulas:
(L) ∀IE (I)
and
(L)+ ∀IE (I) (i.e. ∀I♦∃J (I ⊂ J).
I will now try to show that (L) is self-defeating.
Recall whatwas explained in footnote 2 concerning the relation between the quantier
ranging over rst-order interpretations and the quantier ranging over all second-order
interpretations: the extension of the latter is achieved by the exact same procedure that
extends the range of a rst-order interpretation, since expanding a range presented
as being absolutely general amounts to arriving at a new understanding of absolutely
6 I now try to explain why is it that the adoption of this distinction within Fine's proposed framework
does not cause his expansionist limitativism to collapse into a form of restrictionism. According to
the above characterization of restrictionism, it is the concept that restricts the range of the quantier,
not allowing it to be absolute. On the other hand, according to expansionism it is the interpretation
of the quantier that restricts its range, not allowing it to be absolute. This is clear in the case of
relatively unrestricted quantication, because even though there is no concept restricting the range
of quantication, this is not absolute but rather relative. Now, as an illustration of what I have called
relatively restricted quantication, take the case in which the range of the quantier is restricted to sets.
The fact that it is always possible to nd sets outside the range of quantication cannot be explained
by quantication being restricted to sets. After all, all of these other sets are also sets. That is, they
also fall within the extension of the concept set . Therefore, the fact that it is always possible to nd
sets outside the range of quantication needs to be uniquely explained in terms of interpretations
of quantication. Consequently, adoption of the distinction previously suggested does not cause
expansionism to collapse into restrictionism.
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general quantication, that is, at a new rst-order interpretation. Thus, Fine is not only
committed with,
10. ∀IE (I)
but also with,
11. ∀ME (M).
Notice that if [10] has its intended import, it must range over absolutely every rst-order
interpretation. It then needs to be the case that
12. ∃M¬E (M)
and by simple quanticational logic, we easily arrive at
13. E (M0) ∧ ¬E (M0).
The original point in this argument is that [11] is said to follow from the truth of [10]
by the relation between rst and second-order interpretations. But actually [11] (which
says that every second-order interpretation can be extended) is perfectly consistent with
what Fine had already established in his argument from [6] to [9]. The latter established
that assuming the existence of an absolutely unrestricted second-order interpretation is
self-defeating, so it could even be said that it provides independent support for [11].
Given this, what becomes puzzling is how should the quantier in [10] be interpreted.
Its interpretation cannot be absolutely unrestricted and yet we are obliged to assume that
the quantier ranges over absolutely every rst-order interpretation (for otherwise the
limitativist thesis could not have its intended import). But that is what being an absolutely
unrestricted second-order interpretation consists in, therefore the contradictory [13].
Should we conclude from this that (L) is self-defeating? If there is a particular
second-order interpretation associated with the universal quantier in (L), then the
above argument shows that to be the case. On the other hand, someone might try to
claim that the above argument is awed because [12] does not follow from [10]. The
justication for that inferential move was that [12] must be the case given [10]'s intended
meaning. However, maybe it could be argued that such a justication actually illustrates
a misunderstanding of [10]'s intended meaning. Since [10] says that every interpretation
is indenitely extensible, it should be understood as applying to every interpretation, no
matter what order it might have. Remember that by extending the range of a universal
quantier having a rst-order interpretation In associated with it, we arrive at a new
rst-order interpretation In+1. But that extension also implies an extension of ∀Mn .
Hence, the original extension allows us to arrive at a new second-order interpretation
Mn+1. Now notice that the same is true for third-order interpretations, fourth-order
and so forth and so on. So, by extending the range of ∀In we not only arrive at a new
rst-order interpretation of quantication In+1 but also at a new interpretation for each
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higher order. Given this, it could be claimed that the universal quantier in [10] is to
be understood as ranging over all these interpretations. That being the case, it does not
follow from [10] that there is a second-order interpretationM0 that cannot be extended.
It is obvious that the argument no longer runs if this inference is not allowed.
Is this line of argument available to Fine? In particular, can he make the claim that
the universal quantier in [10] is to be understood as ranging over all interpretations?
Remember that Fine presents himself as a believer in relatively unrestricted quantication,
that is, he does not admit the existence of an absolutely unrestricted quantier. The
difference between both understandings of quantication is precisely that in the case
of the former, a domain is always relative to some interpretation of quantication and
consequently, there cannot be quantication independent of some interpretation. But
then this means that the reasoning developed in the previous paragraph does not allow
Fine to block the argument from [10] to [13].
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